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Macro/International Economics Seminar - Kerstin Holzheu (Science Po)
Title:
Kerstin is currently working on a large revision and will present the revised paper and results. The updated draft is not ready for circulation yet, but can circulate the old draft. The updated abstract is:
Abstract: Wage-posting and wage-bargaining firms coexist. We set up a job-ladder model in which posting firms offer wage–tenure contracts and matching firms bargain by matching outside offers, and estimate each firm鈥檚 protocol as a latent type by maximum likelihood. In Austrian matched employer–employee data, 23 percent of firms are matching firms; flat contracts at posting firms would raise the share to 27 percent, because posted wage growth reads as renegotiation. Matching firms pay less, show more within-firm wage dispersion, occupy higher rungs of the ladder, and concentrate in finance. A German survey that asks establishments about bargaining at the hire gives the same share, 23 percent; its bargaining establishments differ in the same directions on most margins. Pooling the protocols changes the interpretation of three findings: the role of the previous employer in hiring wages, AKM firm effects, and the share of job-to-job moves attributed to non-wage amenities.