果冻传媒

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PG "Work In Progress" Seminar

TBC FOR 2026/27

Postgraduate Work-In-Progress Seminar

A weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub.


Overview

The WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.

  • When: Every Thursday (5pm to 6:15pm)
  • Where: TBC
  • What: Presentation + Q&A

Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc.


Useful Info

The WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.

  • Presentation: 30 minutes
  • Open Discussion / Q&A: 40 minutes
  • Material: Work in progress (essay drafts, thesis sections, a substantial set of notes, ... ).
  • Style: Flexible. Slides, handouts, or neither.
  • Audience: No prior reading or background knowledge expected. All are encouraged to attend and present (including visiting postgraduates).

Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process.


"Should I present?"

1. If you are a postgraduate, then you should present.

2. You are a postgraduate.

3. Therefore, you should present.

 
NEXT TALK

TBC


TBC


ORGANISERS

Tiago Rodrigues

Lucas Menezes 

   

 

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Ana Barandalla, 'Normativity, the second person, and morality'

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Location: S2.77 (The Cowling Room)

The notion of the second person is used to explore the questions about the way we, agents, stand to each other. A particular conception of the second person in currency in ethics is built on the Kantian idea of seeing others as ends - that is, seeing others as having a normative status of their own, independently of any instrumental value they might have. But what kind of thing must normativity be in order for it to be possible that you are normative to me? Korsgaard tailors her account of normativity precisely to answer this question, and thus, to vindicate the conception of the second person as seeing others as ends. I argue that Korsgaard's account of normativity is in conflict with the normative commitments of the notion of seeing others as ends. However, I also argue, that her account of normativity can instead support an alternative, more Humean, conception of the second person.

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