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Applied Microeconomics

Applied Microeconomics

The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.

The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.

Our activities

Work in Progress seminars

Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm

Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.

Applied Econometrics reading group

Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm

Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details

People

Academics

Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:


Natalia Zinovyeva

Co-ordinator

Manuel Bagues

Deputy Co-ordinator


Events

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CRETA Theory Seminar - Hersh Chopra (LSE)

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Location: S2.79

Title: Equilibrium Information Acquisition in Optimal Auctions (joint with Jeff Ely)

 Abstract: We study non-cooperative information acquisition by bidders who will compete in an optimally-designed auction. The bidders simultaneously choose experiments privately revealing information about their respective willingnesses to pay. The auctioneer, knowing the experiments but not the realizations, designs an optimal auction against the resulting information structure. Bidders鈥� best-responses are Myerson-regular: they require no ironing. In the symmetric equilibrium we characterize, each bidder adopts an information structure that satisfies a somewhat stronger regularity property. Among symmetric profiles with this property we show that it is the unique equilibrium.

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